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LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSION
TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS
LEE 0. GARBER*
The heart of our system of public education is the pupil. Therefore, it is par-
ticularly appropriate at this time, when education is claiming so much public at-
tention, that consideration be given to the legal problems involved in the administra-
tion of pupil personnel. School administrators and boards of education, constantly
faced with problems in this field, must look to the law for the answers. A not
inconsequential number of these problems are concerned with the various aspects
of admission requirements.
In considering the question of admission requirements, as they relate to individual
pupils, it is well to recall that constitutional and statutory provisions pertaining to the
question are decisive. When, however, their meanings are not clear and/or when
pertinent questions are not covered by them, recourse must be had to decisional law.
In this article an attempt will be made to discover, from court decisions, those legal
principles which have a bearing upon such admission requirements as relate to age,
health certificates, vaccination, tuition, and residence.
I
Any discussion of the question under consideration must, of necessity, be
prefaced by a consideration of the legal nature of school attendance. Frequently,
it is argued that a child has an inherent or absolute right to attend school at public
expense. While courts sometimes speak of a child's "right" to attend schools,1 an
analysis of their decisions leads to the conclusion that school attendance is not so
much a right as a privilege or a duty imposed upon the child for the public good.2
Courts, in speaking of this right or privilege, quite consistently point out that it is
not an inherent or absolute right, but rather one subject to such reasonable restrictions
and regulations as the state sees fit to place upon itY In this connection, a Con-
necticut court, in considering the matter of school attendance, said:
*Associate Professor of Education, The School of Education, University of Pennsylvania.
Piper v. Big Pine School District of Inyo County, 193 Cal. 664, 226 Pac. 926 (1924); Ward v. Flood,
48 Cal. 36, 17 Am. Rep. 405 (1874); People v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 255 Pac. 61o (1927); Zavilla v.
Masse, 112 Colo. 183, 147 P.2d 823 (1944); Board of Education of Cleveland Heights v. State ex rel.
Goldman, 47 Ohio App. 417, 191 N.E. 914 (1934).
'Bissell v. Davison, 65 Conn. 183, 32 At. 348 (894); Scown v. Czarnecki, 264 I1. 305, io6 N.E.
276 (1914); Fogg v. Board of Education of Littleton, 76 N.H. 296, 82 At. 173 (912); In re Walters,
84 Hun 457, 32 N.Y. Supp. 322 (1895).
'Johnson v. Town of Deerfield, 25 F. Supp. 918 (D. Mass. 1939), afl'd, 3o6 U.S. 621 (1939); Piper
v. Big Pine District of Inyo County, 193 Cal. 664, 226 Pac. 926 (x924); Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36,
17 Am. Rep. 405 (1874); Bissell v. Davison, 65 Conn. 183, 32 At. 348 (1894); Barnard v. Inhabitants
of Shelburne, 216 Mass. 19, 102 N.E. 1o95 (1913); Learock v. Putnam, iii Mass. 499 (1873); Sherman
v. Inhabitants of Charlestown, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) x6o (x851); State v. Drew, 89 N.H. 54, 192 Ad. 629
(1937); State v. Board of Education of City of Antigo, 169 Wis. 231, 172 N.W. 153 (1919).
'Bissell v. Davison, 65 Conn. 183, 190, 32 Ad. 348, 349 (894).
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This is a privilege or advantage, rather than a right, in the strict technical sense of the
term. This privilege is granted, and is to be enjoyed, upon such terms and under such
reasonable conditions and restrictions as the law-making power, within constitutional limits,
may see fit to impose....
To somewhat the same effect is a Colorado decision which holds that "the right to
attend the public schools is a civil right or privilege."5 In other words, it may be
thought of as a right that "is not absolute and unqualified, but one to be enjoyed by
all under reasonable conditions."6 This right is subject to such restrictions as the
state and as boards of education (under the authority granted them by statute) see
fit to place upon it. It is, in other words, "subject to such reasonable regulations as
to qualifications of pupils to be admitted and retained in the respective schools as the
school committee shall prescribe."
With reference to those reasonable rules that a school board may enact, the courts
have identified certain general principles relating to school attendance. In the first
place, they have held that school attendance is not a right, privilege, or immunity
conferred upon one by virtue of his being a citizen of the United States-that ad-
mission cannot be demanded as the result of mere citizenship. This matter is, singu-
larly, a state matter 8 Also, they have held that one living on lands, control over
which has been ceded to the Federal Government, has no right to attend school, free
of tuition, in the school district in which the lands are located' and that children of
parents employed by the Federal Government and living on Indian lands-an Indian
reservation-are without authority to attend the public schools of the district of which
the reservation is a part.Y On the other hand, it has been held that children living
in a federal housing project owned by the United States government and operated in
conjunction with a particular state, cooperating under its housing laws, are entitled to
admission to the public schools of the district in which the housing project is lo-
cated."
In this same connection, it is quite universally agreed that the right or privilege
of attending public schools is one that can be exercised only in the school district in
which the child resides or has his domicile-that a school board, in the absence of
statute, need not admit pupils from other school districts. In some states legislation
has been enacted requiring school districts to admit non-resident pupils. The con-
stitutionality of such legislation has been attacked on numerous occasions. Where
the law requires the district of residence to pay tuition to the receiving district, there
5 Zavilla v. Masse, 112 Colo. 183, i88, 147 P.2d 823, 825 (x944).
'Sherman v. Inhabitants of Charlestown, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 16o, 164 (1851).
"Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelburne, 216 Mass. 19, 21, 102 N.E. 1o95, io96 (1913).
8 Piper v. Big Pine School District of Inyo County, 193 Cal. 664, 226 Pac. 926 (1924); Ward v.
Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 17 Am. Rep. 405 (1874).
9
'ewcomb v. Inhabitants of Rockport, 183 Mass. 74, 66 N.E. 587 (1903); Opinions of Justices,
1840, i Metc. 58o (Mass. 1841); Schwartz v. O'Hara Township School District 375 Pa. 440, xoo A.2d
621 (1953).
"Rockwell v. Independent School District of Rapid City, 48 S.D. 137, 202 N.W. 478 (1925); School
District No. 20 v. Steele, 46 S.D. 589, 195 N.W. 448 (1923).
" McGwinn v. Board of Education of Cleveland City School District, 78 Ohio App. 405, 69 N.E.2d
381 (1946), appeal dismissed, 147 Ohio St. 259, 70 N.E.2d 776 (1947).
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seems to be no question of its legality. Where it does not, however, the question
is moot. One line of reasoning is to the effect that, education being a state function,
a school district must educate all pupils that the state requires it to admit'2 There
seems little reason to believe that a school district may not accept non-resident pupils,
however, if it desires to do so. Where it does, whether voluntarily or under a statute
requiring it to do so, it appears, according to the weight of authority, to have the
right to charge a tuition fee. 3
While it is generally agreed that a school board may accept non-resident pupils,
it should not, necessarily, be concluded that a board must pay the tuition of its own
resident pupils who attend school in another district. In some states, under certain
conditions, statutes require boards to pay the tuition of such pupils. But, in Arkansas,
at least, where there is no statute governing this matter, it has been held that a
district is without authority to pay the tuition of pupils in attendance elsewhere.' 4
Regardless of a school district's authority to impose a tuition fee for the education of
non-resident pupils, or to pay the tuition of pupils in attendance elsewhere, it has
been held that it cannot contract with another board in such a way as to impose
upon the parents of non-resident pupils the duty of paying a matriculation fee.' 5
Also, in South Dakota, it has been held that a school board cannot discharge its
obligation to maintain schools by paying to parents a sum of money in lieu of the
cost of keeping the schools open. In this case, it should be noted, the board dis-
continued its schools, made arrangements for the proper schooling of all pupils (so
desiring it) in other public schools, and made cash payments to parents desiring to
send their children to sectarian schools.'
In connection with the question of the right of a board to admit pupils, it has
been held that a board acted within its authority when it set up different entrance
requirements for those who had not, previously, been enrolled in the system than for
those who had.17 In so ruling, one court said:'
8
This would not mean, however, that the school board, in prescribing a rule that
graduates of its own schools would be admitted without examination, while others who
had graduated or finished courses elsewhere should pass a reasonable examination, had un-
"'Ballou v. Kemp, 92 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1937); Cavanagh v. Ballou, 36 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C.
1941); Wirth v. Corning, 75 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1948); Edwards v. State, 143 Ind. 84, 42 N.E. 525
(1895); Board of Education v. Board of Education, io Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 617, 5 Ohio Dec. 96 (895);
In re Board of Education of Zanesville, 7 Ohio N.P. 564, 5 Ohio S. & C.P. Dec. 578 (1895); Edmondson
v. Board of Education, io8 Tenn. 557, 69 S.W. 274 (1902).
"Town of Belle Point v. Pence, 13 Ky. L. R. 371, 17 S.W. 197 (i891); School District v. Lancaster
County, 6o Neb. 147, 82 N.W. 380 (igoo); Todd v. Board of Education, 54 N.D. 235, 209 N.W.
369 (1926); City of Dallas v. Love, 23 S.W.2d, 431 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930), afl'd, 120 Tex. 351, 40
S.W.2d 20 (1931).
" Board of Education of Gould Special District v. Holdtoff, 171 Ark. 668, 285 S.W. 357 (1926).
"'Peak v. Board of Education of Cuthbert, 77 Ga. 476, 170, SxE. 488 (i933).
"Hlebanja v. Brewe, 58 S.D. 351, 236 N.W. 296 (93).
" Creyhon v. Board of Education of City of Parsons, 99 Kan. 824, x63 Pac. X45 (1917); Kayser
v. Board of Education of City of St. Louis, 273 Mo. 643, 201 S.W. 531 (1918).
"Kayser v. Board of Education of City of St. Louis, 273 Mo. 643, 653-654, 201 S.W. 531, 533
(1918).
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justly discriminated against the persons so required to pass such reasonable examination
test.
As has been said, school attendance is not an absolute right of the child, but a
matter subject to restrictions imposed by proper authorities. Concerning such re-
strictions, it is generally held that a school board may set up attendance areas and
require individual pupils to attend particular schools as long as it acts reasonably
and not in an arbitrary manner. In other words, it is a general rule that a pupil
has no right to attend the school of his choice, within the district.'9 In this con-
nection, it has been held that a child cannot enforce a demand that he be admitted
to the school nearest to his home.2 0 In commenting on this, a New York court held
that the school nearest to a child's home is no more his than is the one most distant 2'
Likewise, it has been held that the authority of a school board to consolidate its
schools is superior to a pupil's right to attend a particular school. Thus, if a board
sees fit to close a particular school, a pupil may not complain on the ground that
the closing of the school is an infringement of his right of attendance thereat.
22
Needless to say, the action of the board must not be arbitrary nor unreasonable, and
it must be in accord with statutes, if any govern this matter.
Again, in referring to the authority of the state to restrict the attendance of pupils,
it has been held that the board, as the agent of the state, has the authority to classify
and assign pupils in such manner as it deems appropriate to their general proficiency
and welfare, as long as it acts reasonably. 3 Thus, it has been held that a statute
requiring the attendance of individual pupils suffering particular handicaps at
"9 Stephens v. Humphrey, 145 Ark. 172, 224 S.W. 442 (1920); Grove v. Board of School Inspectors,
20 II1. 532 (x858); People v. Board of Education, 26 Ill. App. 476 (1888); People v. McFall, 26 Il1.
App. 319 (1887); Steffey v. Sandifer, 202 Il. App. 604 (1916); State v. Wirt, 203 Ind. IM1, 177 N.E.
441 (1931); Webb v. School District No. 990, 167 Kan. 395, 206 P.2d xo66 (949); Alford v. Board
of Education of Campbell County, 298 Ky. 803, 184 S.W.2d 207 (945); Reed v. Mason County Board
of Education, 22o Ky. 489, 295 S.W. 436 (1927); Scott County Board of Education v. Crumbaugh,
213 Ky. 771, 281 S.W. 977 (1926); Morse v. Ashley, 193 Mass. 294, 79 N.E. 48z (19o6); In re Myers,
119 N.Y.S.2d 98 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1953); McEwan v. Broad, 9z N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup. Ct. 1949); People v.
Easton, 13 Abb. Pr. (N.s.) 159 (N.Y. 1872); State ex rel. Lewis v. Board of Education of Wilmington
School District, 137 Ohio St. 245, 28 N.E.2d 491 (1940); Commonwealth v. School Directors, 4 Pa. Dist.
Rep. 314 (i895); Cottrell v. School Board of Amity Township, 55 D. & C. 119, 28 Erie 165 (Pa. 1946).
"o People v. Easton, 13 Abb. Pr. (N.s.) 259 (N.Y. 1872); Commonwealth v. School Directors, 4 Pa.
Dist. Rep. 314 (1895).
'tPeople v. Easton, 13 Abb. Pr. (z;.s.) x59 (N.Y. 1872).
"Walker v. McKenzie, 209 Ga. 653, 74 S.E.2d 870 (1953); State ex rel. Ridge v. Johnson, xxx
N.E.2d 803 (Ind. 1953); Tufts v. State, 119 Ind. 232, 21 N.E. 892 (1889); Potter v. District Township
of Fredericksburg, 40 Iowa 369 (1875); Alford v. Board of Education of Campbell County, 298
Ky. 803, z84 S.W.2d 207 (1945); Morse v. Ashley, X93 Mass. 294, 79 N.E. 481 (x9o6); Ashton v.
Jones, 47 Lack. Jur. 229 (Pa. 1947).
" Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 17 Am. Rep. 405 (1874); Christman v. Board of Education of Con-
solidated Grade School, 347 Ill. App. 324, io6 N.E.2d 846 (r952); In re Petty, 241 Iowa 5o6, 41
N.W.2d 672 (1950); State v. Ghrist, 222 Iowa 2o69, 27o N.W. 376 (1936), modified and rehearing
denied, 222 Iowa 2o69, 272 N.W. 440 (2937); Creyhon v. Board of Education of City of Parsons,
99 Kan. 824, 163 Pac. 145 (1917); Jones v. McProud, 62 Kan. 87o, 64 Pac. 6o2 (igox); Barnard v.
Inhabitants of Shelburne, 216 Mass. ig, 1o2 N.E. o95 (i913); Board of Education of Cleveland Heights
v. State ex rel. Goldman, 47 Ohio App. 417, 191 N.E. 914 (1934); Cottrell v. School Board of Amity
Township, 55 D. & C. 119, 28 Erie 165 (Pa. 2946); State v. Board of Education of City of Antigo, x69
Wis. 231, 172 N.W. 153 (919).
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special schools set up for their education is constitutional.' Likewise, it has been
held that a board's rule requiring attendance at a special ungraded school of those
pupils who had difficulty in doing the work required in the regular grades was a
reasonable rule.25 One of the most interesting cases involving the question of the
authority of a board to exclude a child from a regular school and to assign him to a
particular school-a school for the deaf-was decided in Wisconsin some 35 years
ago2 In this case, a child who was crippled and physically defective, although ap-
parently mentally normal, was assigned to a school for the deaf which the district
maintained. He refused to attend this school and the parents upheld him. The
boy was paralyzed and his physical and nervous make-up was affected. Today,
such a child would probably be called a spastic. He was excitable and required
an undue amount of his teacher's time. In an action by the parents to compel the
board to admit him to his regular class and school, the court upheld the board and
ruled that the rights of the individual pupil must be subordinated to the general
welfare.
It should be noted, however, that this right of the board to classify and assign
pupils has, in a few cases, been held to be restricted by the right of the parent to
direct, within reasonable limits, his children's studies. In commenting on this
matter, the Supreme Court of Colorado said:2
The right of the parents to select, within limits, what their children shall learn is one of
the liberties guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment . . .and of which .. .no state
can deprive them.
In this same connection, it has been held that a pupil's right to school attendance
is not such as to prevent a board from undertaking to reorganize the schools of the
district. In other words, the authority of a school board to consolidate its schools
and, when it deems it necessary, to abolish existing schools, is inherent in the board.!
II
At times the question arises as to what citizens, in terms of age groups, are eligible
to attend free public schools. In answering this question, the courts, quite con-
sistently, have held that constitutional provisions requiring the legislature to maintain
a system of public schools open to all children between certain ages are not to be
interpreted as limitations upon the power of the legislature, and that the legislature
may provide school facilities for those outside these age limits, if it sees fit to do so-
i.e., it may provide for kindergartens, for institutions of higher education, and for
schools for adults. The legislature must do that which is required, but it may go
"In re Petty, 241 Iowa 506, 41 N.W.2d 672 (19!o).
" State v. Ghrist, 222 Iowa io6g, 270 N.W. 376 (1936), modified and rehearing denied, 222 Iowa
1o69, 272 N.W. 440 (1937).
"0 State v. Board of Education of City of Antigo, x69 Wis. 231, 172 N.W. 153 (1919).
"'Mo Hock Ke Lok Po v. Stainback, 74 F. Supp. 852 (D.C. Hawaii 1947); People v. Stanley, 81
Colo. 276, 255 Pac. 6Io (1927); Trustees of Schools v. People, 87 IL 303, 29 Am. Rep. 55 (877).
's People v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 282, 255 Pac. 6io, 613-614 (1927).
a' State ex rel. Ridge v. Johnson, iii N.E.2d 803 (Ind. 1953); In re Myers, i19 N. Y. S.2d 98 (Doam.
Rcl. Ct. 1953).
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beyond the constitutional mandate if it sees fit. A Colorado case is in point.8 0 When
the Supreme Court was asked, by the House of Representatives, to rule on the
question of the authority of the legislature to enact legislation to provide for the
maintenance and support of kindergartens, in light of a constitutional provision re-
quiring the legislature to establish a system of free public schools for all residents
between the ages of 6 and 2i, it held that the legislature had the authority. To the
same effect is a similar ruling by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.81 While the
authority of the legislature to enact legislation relating to the question of age limits
for school admission is quite clear, the question of the authority of school boards
to pass rules and regulations restricting or qualifying a child's right to attend public
schools is not so clear. It is generally held, however, that a board may pass any
reasonable rule or regulation defining age limits within which a child may be ad-
mitted to public school, providing it is not in violation of a statute or constitutional
provision. Frequently, such rules and regulations are questioned on the ground of
reasonableness and-also on the ground that they are violative of such provisions.
In these cases, it becomes the duty of the court to resolve the issue in terms of the
meaning of these provisions.
Some of these questions have involved school board rules setting the time at which
a child may first enter the public schools. In Missouri, one section of the constitu-
tion provided that all persons between the ages of 6 and 2o should receive free in-
struction in the public schools. Another section provided that the public school
fund should be faithfully appropriated for the establishment and maintenance of free
public schools and for no other purpose. In interpreting these, the court ruled that
expenditures by a board of education for the education of children under the age of
6 were prohibited by the constitution. It said:"2 "The two sections, taken together,
amount to both a requirement and a prohibition."
In Massachusetts, a rule of a school board to the effect that a child under the age
of 7 could not enter school except at the beginning of the fall term or within three
or four weeks thereafter, unless he was qualified to enter classes at the time of his
entry, was held to be a reasonable and enforceable rule. The court justified its
ruling as follows:3m
Children under 7 years of age, although allowed to attend the public schools, are not
required to attend .... Grading is a permitted if not an essential feature of the public
school system. The introduction to a school of a very young scholar late in the school
year, if the scholar is not qualified to enter the existing classes, would tend strongly to
impair the efficiency of the school, and so to prevent the other scholars from obtaining from
it such advancement in leaming and in training as would enable them to proceed with
their education in due course.
In a somewhat similar case, an Illinois court held that a school board rule permit-
ting children who had reached the age of 6 to enter school only at the beginning of
"°In re Kindergarten Schools, 18 Colo. 234, 32 Pac. 422 (1893).
"In re Newark School Board, 70 Ad. 88z (N.J. 1907).
"
5 Roach v. Board of St. Louis Public Schools, 77 Mo. 484, 488 (1883).
"Alvord v. Inhabitants of Town of Chester, i8o Mass. 20, 21, 6z N.E. 263, 264 (I9o).
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the fall and spring terms was unreasonable.3 4 The statute made it the duty of the
board to maintain schools for all children over the age of 6 and under the age of
21. In this case an action was brought by a parent to compel the board to admit a
child as soon as he attained the age of 6, which was approximately 31 days after the
beginning of the term. The court, in ruling for the parent, reasoned that because
the rule caused the child to lose the benefits of free schooling for the remainder of
the term, it was unreasonable.
In a Massachusetts case, the court held that a compulsory attendance law requir-
ing parents to send those children to school who were between the ages of 8 and 14
was not to be interpreted as a definition of scholars of legal school age. As a result,
it ruled that another law that provided that all children might attend public school
subject to restrictions placed upon their attendance by law, was applicable to "all
the residents of the commonwealth under the age of 21 years, as soon as they have
sufficient capacity. ' ' 5
Another aspect of this question of the authority of a school board to set age
limits governing school attendance, concerns the rights of a board to deny admission
to those in the upper-age levels. In this connection, a federal court has held that
the word "pupils," as used in a federal law providing that pupils whose parents
were employed in Washington, D. C. were entitled to attend school there, regardless
of their place of residence, did not refer solely to those below college level and under
the age of 2IY0 In this case, a girl whose father was employed in Washington, D. C.
attended Wilson Teachers College. For several years she was admitted without
tuition charge. Upon reaching the age of 21, however, she was billed for tuition.
In an action to enjoin the superintendent from dismissing this non-resident, it was
contended that the law did not apply to those doing collegiate work and to those
beyond the age of 2i, on the ground that such pupils were emancipated. The court
ruled differently, in terms of its interpretation of the intent of Congress.
Along somewhat the same line, a North Dakota court was asked to rule on the
reasonableness of a school board rule requiring each pupil, with certain exceptions,
to pay a tuition fee of $7.50 for each half unit of credit earned after he had spent four
years in high school attendance. When a boy failed to obtain enough credits to
graduate in four years, and returned the fifth year, a board attempted to charge him
tuition and justified its actions under the rule just mentioned. The court held the
rule unreasonable in light of a constitutional requirement that the legislature provide
a system of schools equally free, open, and accessible to all children between the
ages of 6 and 21. " In Wisconsin, on the other hand, it has been held that a school
board was justified in charging tuition for an over-age pupil. 8
8 Board of Education v. Bolton, 85 II1. App. 92 (1899).
"Inhabitants of Needham v. Inhabitants of Wellesley, 139 Mass. 372, 374, 31 N.E. 732, 733 (1885).
88 Cavanagh v. Ballou, 36 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1941).
"7 Batty v. Board of Education of City of Williston, 67 N.D. 6, 269 N.W. 49 (1936).
" Maxcy v. City of Oshkosh, 144 Wis. 238, 128 N.W. 899 (i9io).
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III
As has been indicated, admission to public school is not an absolute right of the
child but a privilege extended to him by the state. From this it follows that the
state may, through the legislature or some other properly constituted authority such
as a board of education, make rules or regulations excluding children from school
if their presence is, in any way, a danger to the health of other children 0 As a re-
sult, it has been held that a school board may pass a rule requiring physical examina-
tions and/or health certificates of all pupils under the pain of expulsion for those
who refuse to comply. 0 It may also spend public funds to hire doctors and nurses
to make health inspections,41 but it may not use such funds to pay for the treatment
of pupils 2 In commenting on the authority of a school board to require physical
examinations as a prerequisite to admission to public schools, a South Dakota court
has said :4 ".. . a thing may be reasonable, though it conflicts with the individual
views of the few, if it conforms to that of the many."
With regard to the authority of a state agency, a board of health, to exclude
children from school when their presence endangers the health of others, it has been
held that this authority extends to the exclusion of children who are not necessarily
ill but who are suspected of being infected with some contagion. In North Dakota,
it has been held that an order of the county board of health excluding children who
were suspected of being afflicted with trachoma from attending public school was
reasonable. 44  Similarly, in Minnesota, it has been held that a school board, in the
exercise of general authority conferred upon it by a city charter, had the right to
exclude pupils whose physical condition might endanger the health of others.
IV
Courts have consistently held that statutes requiring compulsory vaccination are
constitutional-that the passage of such acts is a legitimate exercise of the police power
of the state. Such statutes may require the vaccination of all persons or they may
authorize or require boards of education to set up a vaccination requirement as a
prerequisite to school attendance, even in the absence of an epidemic4 The consti-
" Hallett v. Post Printing and Publishing Co., 68 Colo. 573, 192 Pac. 658 (1920); Carr v. Inhabitants
of Town of Dighton, 229 Mass. 304, 118 N.E. 525 (i9i8); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 309 Mass. 476,
35 N.E.2d 8oi (1941); Stone v. Probst, i65 Minn. 361, 2o6 N.W. 642 (1925); Martin v. Craig, 42
N.D. 213, 173 N.W. 787 (1919); Crane v. School District No. 14 of Tillamook County, 95 Ore. 644,
188 Pac. 712 (1920).
4 . -Hallett v. Post Printing and Publishing Co., 68 Co1. 573, 192 Pac. 658 (x920); Streich v. Board
of Education of Independent School District of City of Aberdeen, 34 S.D. 169, 147 N.W. 779 (914).
"See cases in note 40 supra, and also: State v. Brown, 112 Minn. 370, x28 N.W. 294 (1x9o); City
of Dallas v. Mosely, 286 S.W. 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
"Board of Education of City School District of Cleveland v. Ferguson, 68 Ohio App. 514, 39 N.E.2d
196 (194i); McGilvra v. Seattle School District No. I, 113 Wash. 619, 194 Pac. 817 (1921).
" Streich v. Board of Education of Independent School District of City of Aberdeen, 34 S.D. 169, 181,
147 N.W. 779, 783 (194).
"Martin v. Craig, 42 N.D. 213, 173 N.W. 787 (1919).
' Stone v. Probst, 165 Minn. 361, 206 N.W. 642 (1925).
'Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusettts, 197 U.S. Il (i9o5); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174
(1922); Abed v. Clark, 84 Cal. 226, 24 Pac. 383 (189o); French v. Davidson, 143 Cal. 658, 77 Pac.
663 (1904); State Board of Health v. Board of Trustees of Watsonville School District, X3 Cal. App.
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tutionality of such statutes has been attacked on numerous grounds, none of which
have been held adequate. It has been held that the state, under the exercise of the
police power, has the right to enact legislation designed to promote and protect the
health and welfare of the people, as long as it acts reasonably and not in an arbitrary
manner.47 Courts will not interfere with the discretion of the legislature, neither
will they be concerned with its wisdom, in such matters."S
It has also been held that statutes concerning vaccination are neither unreasonable,
arbitrary, nor discriminatory; that they do not deprive one of his rights without due
process of law;49 and that they are not unconstitutional as class legislation.50
In this connection, a Pennsylvania court has held that a statute requiring vaccina-
tion is not unconstitutional on the ground that "it authorizes a trespass upon the
reserved rights of the individual which are beyond the reach of even the police
power."5' 1 Instead, it ruled that such a statute "is not only a justifiable but a wise
and beneficent exertion of the police power over the public health."52 Also, a New
York court, in ruling such a statute was a proper exercise of the police power, pointed
out that while the court recognized differences of opinion even among physicians
as to the efficacy of vaccination, the legislature had the right to pass a law which,
according to common belief, would result in preventing the spread of contagion be-
514, nio Pac. 137 (i9io); Bissell v. Davison, 65 Conn. 183, 32 Ad. 348 (i894); Anderson v. State,
84 Ga. App. 259, 65 S.E.2d 848 (i951); Morris v. City of Columbus, io2 Ga. 792, 30 S.E. 850 (x898);
Mosier v. Barren County Board of Health, 3o8 Ky. 829, 215 S.W.2d 967 (948); Hammond v. Town
of Hyde Park, 195 Mass. 29, 8o N.E. 650 (1907); Spofford v. Carlton, 238 Mass. 528, i31 N.E. 314
(X921); Matthews v. Board of Education, 127 Mich. 530, 86 N.W. 1036 (i9oi); State v. Cole, 22o Mo.
697, 119 S.W. 424 (i909); Barber v. School Board of Rochester, 82 N.H. 426, 135 Atl. 159 (1926);
Cram v. School Board of Manchester, 82 N.H. 495, 136 At. 263 (1927); State v. Drew, 89 N.H. 54,
192 At. 629 (1937); Sadlock v. Board of Education of Borough of Carlstadt, 137 N.J.L. 85, 58 A.2d 218
(1948); In re Walters, 84 Hun 457, 32 N.Y. Supp. 322 (r895); People v. Ekerold, 211 N.Y. 386, 105
N.E. 670 (1914); Viemeister v. White, 88 App. Div. 44, 84 N.Y. Supp. 712 (2d Dep't 1903), afl'd,
179 N.Y. 235, 72 N.E. 97 (1904); State v. Hay, x26 N.C. 199, 35 S.E. 459 (1900); State v. Board
of Education of Village of Barberton, 29 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 375 (9o5), afT'd, 76 Ohio St. 297, 8i N.E.
568 (1907); State v. Board of Education of City of Cincinnati, 154 Ohio St. 469, 96 N.E.2d 413 (951);
Field v. Robinson, 198 Pa. 638, 48 At. 873 (901); Stull v. Reber, 215 Pa. 156, 64 At. 419 (i9o6);
Zucht v. King, 225 S.W. 267 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); State v. Shorrock, 55 Wash. 2o8, 104 Pac. 214
-(X909).
"Abeel v. Clark, 84 Cal. 226, 24 Pac. 383 (189o); French v. Davidson, 143 Cal. 658, 77 Pac.
663 (1904); Morris v. City of Columbus, 102 Ga. 792, 30 S.E. 85o (898); Sadlock v. Board of Educa-
tion of Borough of Carlstadt, 137 N.J.L. 85, 58 A.2d 218 (1948); State v. Board of Education of
Village of Barberton, 29 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 375 (1905), ef'd, 76 Ohio St. 297, 8i N.E. 568 (1907);
Stull v. Reber, 215 Pa. 156, 64 Ad. 419 (i9o6).
"s State Board of Health v. Board of Trustees of Watsonville School District, 13 Cal. App. 514, 110
Pac. 137 (i9io); Bissell v. Davison, 65 Conn. 183, 32 At. 348 (1894); Anderson v. State, 84 Ga. App.
259, 65 S.E.2d 848 (i95i); Cram v. School Board of Manchester, 82 N.H. 495, 136 Ad. 263 (1927);
Sadlock v. Board of Education of Borough of Carlstadt, 137 N.J.L. 85, 58 A.2d 218 (1948).
"'Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Abeel v. Clark, 84 Cal. 226,
24 Pac. 383 (189o); Bissell v. Davison, 65 Conn. X83, 32 At. 348 (1894); Cram v. School Board of
Manchester, 82 N.H. 495, 136 At. 263 (1927); Viemeister v. 'White, 88 App. Div. 44, 84 N.Y. Supp.
712 (2d Dep't 1903), afl'd, 179 N.Y. 235, 72 N.E. 97 (1904); Stull v. Reber, 215 Pa. 156, 64 At.
419 (19o6); Staffel v. San Antonio School Board, 2oi S.W. 413 (Tex. Civ. App. i918).
" French v. Davidson, 143 Cal. 658, 77 Pac. 663 (1904).
"' Stull v. Reber, 215 Pa. 156, 163, 64 Ad. 419, 421 (i9o6).
"'Id. at 163, 64 At. at 421.
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cause "what the people believe is for the common welfare must be accepted as
tending to promote the common welfare, whether it does in fact or not.' 53
In many cases challenging the constitutionality of such statutes, it has been con-
tended that they violate one's liberty of conscience and right of religious freedom."
With these contentions, the courts are in consistent disagreement. Concerning this
matter, a New Jersey court pointed out that "the constitutional guaranty of religious
freedom was not intended to prohibit legislation with respect to the general public
welfare."55  To the same effect is a New York decision in which the court ruled
that the constitution makers "did not intend that the law would protect a person
who might conceive of a God and the worship of that conception of God in a man-
ner which might endanger the lives of the community in which such person might
live."5  Similarly, in one of the most recent decisions of this type"' the court
said:5s
* . religious freedom embraces two conceptions, "Freedom to believe and freedom to
act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be." ...
* . * the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom does not permit the practice of
religious rights dangerous or detrimental to the lives, safety or health of the participants
or to the public....
There may be no interference with appellant's ... religious belief against vaccination,
but he may not endanger the health of the community by refusing to have his daughter
vaccinated.
In a somewhat similar case, recently decided in Georgia, the court said:"'
Liberty of conscience is one thing. License to endanger the lives of others by practices
contrary to statutes passed for the public safety and in reliance upon modern medical
knowledge is another. . . . The opinion of the defendants that they should practice
healing without the aid of medicine is not a legal justification for refusal to abide by the
statutes of this state and regulations passed pursuant thereto, and for this reason freedom
of worship was not an issue in the case.
With respect to the legality of such legislation, a California court has held that
a compulsory attendance act passed subsequent to a compulsory vaccination act did
not repeal the latter, on the ground that courts do not favor repeal by implication'
Where the statute gives the school board the right to require vaccination of all
:3 Viemeister v. White, 179 N.Y. 235, 241, 72 N.E. 97, 99 (1o4).
4 Anderson v. State, 84 Ga. App. 259, 65 S.E.2d 848 (x95i); Mosier v. Barren County Board of
Health, 308 Ky. 829, 215 S.W.2d 967 (1948); Commonwealth v. Green, 268 Mass. 585, x68 N.E. lox
(1929); Sadlock v. Board of Education of Borough of Carlstadt, 137 N.J.L. 85, 58 A.2d 2x8 (1948);
In re Whitmore, 47 N.Y.S.2d r43 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1944); State ex rel. Dunham v. Board of Education
of City School District of Cincinnati, 154 Ohio St. 469, 96 N.E.2d 413 (i95i); Dunham v. Board of
Education of City School District of Cincinnati, 98 N.E.2d 594 (Ohio ig5o); Staffel v. San Antonio
School Board, 201 S.W. 413 (Tex. Civ. App. 19x8).
" Sadlock v. Board of Education of Borough of Carstadt, 137 N.J.L. 85, 91, 58 A.2d 218, 222 (1948).
661n re Whitmore, 47 N.Y.S.2d x43, 146 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1944).
"TMosier v. Barren County Board of Health, 308 Ky. 829, 215 S.W.2d 967 (1948).
a Id. at 833, 215 S.W.2d at 969.
"'Anderson v. State, 84 Ga. App. 259, 264, 65 S.E.2d 848, 852 (x951).
soState Board of Health v. Board of Trustees of Watsonvile School District, 13 Cal. App. 5r4, 1to
Pac. 137 (1910).
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pupils who are physically fit, it has been held that, in the case of an epidemic, a
school board may require that those excepted be vaccinated or excluded. In so
holding, a Massachusetts court ruled that the statute "was not intended to take away
from the school committee the power to make proper regulations for the protection
of all the pupils, if the prevalence of smallpox seems to require special precautions."
8 1
Where there is no statute requiring or permitting compulsory vaccination, the
rule appears to be somewhat different. Then, so it is generally held, a school board
has the right to pass a rule requiring vaccination as a condition precedent to attend-
ance, but the right is dependent upon the existence of an epidemic or an emergency 2
However, the opposite has been heldP3 Thus, a North Carolina court took the stand
that a board had as much right to take action to prevent the occurrence of an epi-
demic as it had to halt the epidemic after it had once started. 4 In support of the
general rule that a school may require pupils to be vaccinated during the existence
of an epidemic, on the pain of not being permitted to attend, a Pennsylvania court
said:"'
It would not be doubted that the directors would have the right to close the schools
temporarily during the prevalence of any serious disease of an infectious or contagious
character. This would be a refusal of admission to all the children of the district....
For the same reason they may exclude such children as decline to comply with require-
ments looking to prevention of the spread of contagion, provided these requirements are
not positively unreasonable in their character.
An Illinois case held that a school board did not exceed its authority in requiring the
vaccination of all pupils during an epidemic-that it was not required to limit the
application of the rule solely to those who had been exposed. In so holding the court
said :(" "No child has a constitutional right to carry to others in school the loathsome
disease of smallpox."
Sometimes boards of health, either state or local, or both, pass rules requiring
vaccination as a condition precedent to school attendance. When such is the casei
the situation becomes somewhat more complicated, particularly if the school board
disapproves. Such a situation arose in Michigan during the school year x922-23.
The state board of health, in the exercise of its discretion, passed a resolution re-
6 Hammond v. Town of Hyde Park, 195 Mass. 29, 31-32, 8o N.E. 650, 651 (1907).
" Auten v. Board of Directors of Special School District of Little Rock, 83 Ark. 431, 104 SV. 130
(1907); Burroughs v. Mortenson, 312 Ill. 163, 143 N.E. 457 (1924); People v. Board of Education, 234
Il. 422, 84 N.E. 1046 (ipo8); Potts v. Breen, 167 Ill. 67, 47 N.E. 81 (,897); Osborn v. Russell, 64
Kan. 507, 68 Pac. 6o (1902); Mathews v. Board of Education of School District No. 1, 127 Mich. 530,
86 N.W. 1036 (Igo); Bright v. Beard, 132 Minn. 375, x57 N.W. 501 (igI6); State v. Zimmerman, 86
Minn. 353, 90 N.W. 783 (9o2); State ex rel O'Bannon v. Cole, 220 Mo. 697, 119 S.W. 424 (i9o9);
Rhea v. Board of Education of Devils Lake Special School District, 41 N.D. 449, 171 N.W. 103 (1919);
Duffield v. School District of City of Williamsport, 162 Pa. St. 476, 29 Ad. 742 (x894); Glover v.
Board of Education, 14 S.D. 139, 84 N.W. 761 (9oo); Zucht v. San Antonio School Board, x7o S.W.
840 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
"In re Rebenack, 62 Mo. App. 8 (895); Hutchins v. School Committee of Town of Durham, 137
N. C. 68, 49 S.E. 46 (1904).
' Hutchins v. School Committee of Town of Durham, 137 N.C. 68, 49 S.E. 46 (1904).
"rDuffield v. Williamsport School District, 162 Pa. 476, 483, 29 Ad. 742 (1894).
'
6 Hagler v. Lamer, 284 Ill. 547, 552-553, 120 N.E. 575, 577 (igi8).
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quiring all teachers, pupils, and janitors in the Lansing schools to be vaccinated or
excluded from school. The local board of education passed a resolution reciting
the fact. there was no epidemic, as there were only 17 cases, and directed the admission
of all, whether vaccinated or not. In a mandamus action the court required the
enforcement of the board of health's order. It followed the line of reasoning,
accepted by most courts,07 to the effect that a board of health (either state or local),
while not expressly authorized so to do, may, under a general grant of authority,
pass a rule or regulation requiring vaccination as a condition precedent to school at-
tendance, but only when an epidemic exists0 8 Concerning the rights of pupils or
boards of education to complain of such regulations of boards of health, an
Arkansas court said: 69
It is true that the board of health is not authorized to manage or control the schools
of the state, either public or private. That power is conferred upon other agencies. The
prevention or spread of contagious or infectious diseases by preventing unvaccinated
persons from associating with the school children and school teachers of the state in no
way infringes upon the constitutional right to attend the schools or the management and
control thereof by school boards or directors.
This authority of boards of health to require vaccination, under a general grant
of power, has been denied in at least one case,70 in which it was held that the board
had only those powers expressly granted to it, and that it had no legislative authority,
such as would be essential to taking the action it did. In another case, an Illinois
court held that a statute giving boards of health the authority to make rules and
regulations to check the spread of disease, and giving them quarantine power, did
not confer this authority on the Commissioner of Health in Chicago, which city had
no board of health.7 '
Courts have frequently ruled that a board of education and a board of health
have the authority to require vaccination on pain of exclusion; furthermore, it has
been held that this authority is also vested in the city council and that an ordinance
to this effect is legal.7 2
As has been indicated, this right of requiring vaccination, regardless of who exer-
cises it, can only be exercised in case of the existence of an epidemic, in the absence
"' People v. Board of Educatiqn of City of Lansing, 224 Mich. 388, 400-40x, x95 N.W. 95, 99 (1923).
" Seubold v. Fort Smith Special School District, 218 Ark. 56o, 237 S.W.zd 884 (i95i); State v.
Martin, and Brazil v. State, 134 Ark. 420, 204 S.W. 622 (x18); Hagler v. Larer, 284 Ill. 547, r2o
N.E. 575 (i9i8); People v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 234 IIl. 422, 84 N.E. 1046 (19o8);
School Directors v. Breen, 6o Ill. App. 201 (1895); Blue v. Beach, x55 Ind. 1z, 56 N.E. 89 (sgoo);
State v. Beil, 157 Ind. 26, 6o N.E. 672 (igor); Vonnegut v. Baun, 2o6 Ind. I72, 188 N.E. 677 (1934);
Osborn v. Russell, 64 Kan. 507, 68 Pac. 6o (1902); Board of Trustees of Highland Park Graded Common
School District v. McMurtry, 169 Ky. 457, 184 SA. 390 (igs6); Mosier v. Barren County Board of
Health, 3o8 Ky. 829, 215 S.W.2d 967 (1948); Crane v. School District No. 14 of Tillamook County,
9'5 Ore. 644, r88 Pac. 712 (r92o); State v. Board of Education of Salt Lake City, 21 Utah 401, 6o Pac.
1013 (i9oo); State v. Partlow, 119 Wash. 316, 2o5 Pac. 420 (1922).
"
9State v. Martin, 134 Ark. 420, 425-426, 204 S.W. 622, 624 (1918).
"' State v. Burdge, 95 Wis. 390, 7o N.W. 347 (1897).
"'Burroughs v. Mortenson, 312 Ill- 163, x43 N.E. 457 (1924).
" City of New Braunfels v. Waldschmidt, io9 Tex. 302, 207 S. 303 (19x8); Zucht v. King, 225
S.W. 267 (Tex. Cir. App. 1920).
ADMISSION TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS
of a statute to the contrary. In defining what constitutes an epidemic, it will be
found that courts differ. In Indiana, where the court held a board of health had
the authority to compel vaccination, it was held the statute vested the board with
jurisdiction to determine whether an epidemic did or did not exist 7 In Kentucky
and Arkansas it has been held that a board of health that had the authority to compel
vaccination of school children might use its discretion in determining when the need
for such action threatened-that it need not wait until an epidemic existed, but could
act to forestall a threatened epidemic. 4 In Michigan it has been held that the
existence of 17 cases of smallpox in the city of Lansing was sufficient to constitute an
epidemic' In Minnesota, where one case of smallpox appeared among the stu-
dents of a large high school, the court held that the board of health was authorized
to make vaccination compulsory. 6 In another Michigan case, where smallpox
existed throughout the state, but there were no cases in Kalamazoo, the court ruled
there was no epidemic there, and that the Kalamazoo school board was without
authority to pass a rule requiring vaccination." In Illinois it has been held that
there is nothing in the nature of an emergency in the occasional recurrence of cases
of smallpox, to warrant the passing of a rule requiring that all pupils be vaccinated.'
In any case, when boards of education or boards of health find it necessary to pass
rules requiring vaccination, such rules become ineffective once the emergency ceases
to exist.7
Another aspect of the problem of vaccination, as it relates to attendance, concerns
the right of a school board, or of a board of health, to prescribe the method of vacci-
nation. Concerning this matter, courts have consistently held that such boards have
the authority-that they may adopt any reasonable rule or regulation to effect the
purpose sought to be accomplished. As a result, courts have consistently held that a
rule requiring inoculation with the virus of cowpox is reasonable.50 In this con-
nection, a Missouri court has held that vaccination, by means of giving vaccine virus
internally in the form of pills or tablets, did not meet the requirements of a board
rule that required each pupil to present a certificate to the effect he had been vac-
cinated with vaccine virus."' To the same general effect are court rulings in
" Vonnegut v. Baun, 206 Ind. 172, 188 N.E. 677 (1934).
74 State v. Martin, 134 Ark. 420, 204 S.W. 622 (1918); School Directors v. Breen, 6o Ill. App. 201
(1895); Board of Trustees of Highland Park Graded Common School District v. McMurtry, 169 Ky.
437, 184 S.W. 390 (x6); Mosier v. Barren County Board of Health, 308 Ky. 829, 215 S.W.2d 967
(1948).
" People v. Board of Education of City of Lansing, 224 Mich. 388, 195 N.W. 95 (923).
o Bright v. Beard, 132 Minn. 375, 157 NAV. 50X (1916).
"Mathews v. Board of Education of School District No. x, 127 Mich. 530, 86 N.W. 1036 (r9oI).
"s People v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 234 Ill. 422, 84 N.E. 1046 (1go8).
"DSchool Directors v. Breen, 6o Il1. App. 2o1 (895); Blue v. Beach, 155 Ind. 121, 56 N.E. 89
(19oo); Zucht v. San Antonio School Board, 170 S.W. 840, (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
" Allen v. Ingolls, x82 Ark. 991, 33 S.W.2d io99 (1931); State ex rel. O'Bannon v. Cole, 22o Mo.
697, 119 S.W. 424 (gog); Lee v. Marsh, 230 Pa. 351, 79 Ad. 564 (Igr); Abney v. Fox, 250 S.W. 210
(Tex. Civ. App. 1923); McSween v. Board of School Trustees of City of Ft. Worth, 6o Tex. Civ.'App.
270, 129 SA. 206 (i91o).
81 State ex rel. O'Bannon v. Cole, 22o Mo. 697, 119 S.W. 424 (1909).
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Texas. 2 Here it has been held that a rule requiring vaccination by scarification was
not unreasonable on the ground it gave preference to a particular school of medi-
cine. 3 In a Pennsylvania case, where the statute required vaccination as a condition
precedent to school attendance, the court, in considering the intent of the legislature,
stated that the obvious intent was to require "inoculation with the virus of cowpox
for the purpose of communicating that disease as a prophylactic against smallpox.
It indicates an operation, and not a result.""4
Where parents have refused to have their children vaccinated as required by
statute and/or a rule of the school board or board of health, and the children have
been refused admission, the question of whether or not the parents may be prosecuted
for violating the compulsory education law has sometimes arisen. On the question
of the parents' liability under such circumstances, the courts are not in agreement.
It appears that in those states where the statute permits or requires vaccination as
a prerequisite to attendance, courts are likely to hold that a parent whose child is
excluded because the parent refuses to have him vaccinated will be guilty of violating
a compulsory education law. 5 In commenting on this matter, a Massachusetts court
said:"' "The statutory obligation to cause children to attend school involves an
obligation to put them into condition to attend, and cannot be escaped by neglect
to qualify them for attendance." This, it would seem, constitutes a sound principle
of law. There appears to be, however, at least one case on the other side. In Ohio
it has been held that a parent was not guilty, under similar circumstances.87 Where,
however, a board requires vaccination because of the existence of an epidemic, a
Missouri court has held that a parent could not be prosecuted when he failed to have
his child vaccinated and the child was excluded, on the ground that the compulsory
education statute and the statute giving the board the authority to make all needful
rules, must be considered together8 This case is to be distinguished from those
previously cited, because here exclusion was temporary, i.e., for the period of the
existence of the epidemic only. In the others, exclusion was permanent, unless the
child was later vaccinated.
V
Another aspect of the problem of pupil attendance involves the question of re-
quiring resident pupils to pay tuition and/or fees as a condition precedent to school
"t Abney v. Fox, 250 S.W. 210 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); McSween v. Board of School Trustees of City
of Ft. Worth, 6o Tex. Civ. App. 270, 129 SV. 2o6 (1gio).
,3 McSween v. Board of School Trustees of City of Ft. Worth, 6o Tex. Civ. App. 270, 129 S.W. 2o6
(19o).
8
'Lee v. Marsh, 23o Pa. 351, 357, 79 At. 564, 566 (1911).
8 5 Anderson v. State, 84 Ga. App. 259, 65 S.E.2d 848 (x151); Commonwealth v. Childs, 299 Mass.
367, 12 N.E.2d 814 (1938); Commonwealth v. Green, 268 Mass. 585, 68 N.E. 1o1 (1929); State v.
Drew, 89 N.H. 54, 192 Ad. 629 (1937); In re Whitmore, 47 N.Y.S.ad 143 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1944);
People v. Ekerold, 211 N.Y. 386, xo5 N.E. 670 (i954); People v. Mellwain, 15 N.Y. Supp. 366 (Co.
Ct. 1915); Commonwealth v. Butler, 76 Pa. Super. 113 (1921); In re Marsh, 140 Pa. Super, 472,
14 A.2d 368 (r940).
:0 Commonwealth v. Childs, 299 Mass. 367, 12 N.E.2d 8r4, 815 (1938).
'State v. Turney, 3r Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 222 (199o).8 State ex rel. O'Bannon v. Cole, 220 Mo. 697, 119 S.W. 424 (199o).
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attendance. In some cases statutes have been enacted requiring such payment.
In other cases, local school boards have attempted their collection in the absence
of statute. In general, the courts are agreed that a statute requiring the payment of
any fees is unconstitutional, where the constitution requires the legislature to main-
tain a system of free public schools s9 While recognizing this rule, it is interesting
to note that a South Carolina court approved an exception to it in 19oiY° It held
that the legislature had never set up a system of free schools such as was contemplated
by the framers of the i868 constitution, which provided for such a system, apparently,
but did not make its creation mandatory because it set no time limit. It merely
provided that such a system should be set up as soon as practicable. The entire
scheme, in 19Ol, was still speculative and tentative. Consequently, the court held
that there was nothing to prohibit the legislature from adopting some other scheme
-one authorizing the payment of tuition fees-until such time as it found it prac-
ticable to set up the scheme contemplated by the constitution.
Where the school board passes a rule requiring the payment of tuition by resi-
dent pupils, the courts are also generally agreed that the rule is illegal if the consti-
tution or legislation requires the mantenance of a free public school systemY1 A
Missouri court has also ruled that a school board had no right to charge tuition, even
though the purpose of charging the fee was to recover money which board members
had, individually, put up to buy equipment to start a two-year high schoolY2 In
Kentucky, however, in a somewhat different kind of case, the court approved the
charging of a tuition fee. Here, the teacher, by contract, was required to teach the
common branches. When a parent demanded that his child be taught the higher
branches, the teacher, with the board's permission, required the payment of a
tuition fee, and the court approved.93
It has also been held that a school board cannot charge a registration fee,94 or a
matriculation fee,95 both of which are in the nature of a charge for tuition. In
Alabama, on the other hand, it has been held that a school board may pass a rule
requiring the payment of matriculation or incidental fees 6 In this state, apparently,
there is no constitutional requirement to the effect that the legislature shall main-
" Special School District No. 65, Logan County v. Bangs, 144 Ark. 34, 221 S.W. io6o (i92o);
Irvin v. Gregory, 86 Ga. 605, 13 S.E. 120 (i8gi); Holler v. Kock Hill School District, 6o S.C. 41, 38
S.E. 220 (1901).
"0 Holler v. Rock Hill School District, 6o S.C. 41, 38 S.E. 220 (190).
"XBryant v. Whisenant, z67 Ala. 325, 52 So. 525 (igo); Roberson v. Oliver, 189 Ala. 82, 66 So.
645 (1914); Brewer v. Ray, 149 Ga. 596, 1o S.E. 667 (1919); People v. Moore, 240 111 408, 88 N.E.
979 (909).
" State ex rel. Roberts v. Wilson, 221 Mo. App. 9, 297 S.W. 419 (1927).
"
5 Major v. Cayce, 98 Ky. 357, 33 S.W. 93 (1895).
"Dowell v. School District No. 1, 22o Ark. 828, 250 S.W.2d 127 (1952).
"Brewer v. Ray, 149 Ga. 596, 5o S.E. 667 (i959); Brinson v. Jackson, x68 Ga. 353, 548 S.E.
96 (1929); Claxton v. Stanford, i6o Ga. 752, 128 S.E. 887 (1925); Peak v. Board of Education of
Cuthbert, 177 Ga. 476, 170 S.E. 488 (1933); Wilson v. Stanford, 133 Ga. 483, 66 S.E. 258 (i9o9).
"Bryant v. Whisenant, x67 Ala. 325, 52 So. 525 (i9io); Kennedy v. County Board of Education,
214 Ala. 349, 107 So. 907 (1926); Roberson v. Oliver, 589 Ala. 82, 66 So. 645 (9x4); Roberts v.
Bright, 222 Ala. 677, 133 So. 907 (1931); Ryan v. Sawyer, 195 Ala. 69, 70 So. 652 (5916); Vincent v.
County Board of Education of Talladega County, 222 Ala. 216, 131 So. 893 (5935).
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tain a system of free schools. Instead, the constitution requires a "liberal system."
In commenting on this, one court said :9
This means that the schools shall be liberally maintained, and that they should be open
to common and general use. But details of management involving charges such as are
involved in this appeal [matriculation fee as well as a reasonable fee for library, laboratory
and shop] may be left to the school trustees in charge.
While approving such fees, the courts of Alabama have, however, refused to approve
a tuition fee. s Also, the Alabama courts have refused to permit the use of inci-
dental fees for the purpose of supplementing teachers' salaries, 9 and have even
held a teacher liable in damages for expelling a child who refused to pay such a fee,
although the teacher acted under the direction of the board.100
In South Carolina and Missouri, on the other hand, the courts have held that
a resolution of the board requiring the payment of an incidental fee was illegal.101
In the South Carolina case, the purpose of the fee was to raise money to pay for
heating, seats, and an addition to the building. The court ruled that if the right
to charge such a fee existed there would be no limit to the amount a board might
charge.
It must be remembered that what has been said regarding the payment of tuition
and fees applies only to pupils resident in the district. Frequently, some peculiar
situations arise with reference to the payment of tuition by non-resident pupils.
In Illinois a law authorized the school board of a school district that did not maintain
a high school, to pay the tuition of those pupils, attending high school in another
district, whose parents could not afford to do so. The court held the law obnoxious
on the ground that if tuition was to be free to some, it must be free to all, since
within a school district all children must be treated alike.102 Again, in Iowa a law
provided that pupils residing in a district that did not maintain a high school might
attend any high school that would receive them and that the home district would
pay the tuition, not to exceed $8 per month. When one district, whose per-pupil
cost amounted to $15 per month, attempted to collect from parents of non-resident
pupils $7 per month additional for tuition-the difference between the actual cost
and the amount paid by the home district-an action was brought to restrain it
from so doing.'0 3 The court held that the board's action in charging this tuition fee
was justified, because it was under no legal compunction to accept the non-resident
pupils.
In a somewhat similar case, where a school district attempted to collect the differ-
" Vincent v. County Board of Education of Talladega County, 222 Ala. 2z6, 217, 131 So. 893, 894
(91).
,:Bryant v. Whisenant, 167 Ala. 325, 52 SO. 525 (i9io).
'
9 Hughes v. Outlaw, I97 Ala. 452, 73 So. i6 (i916); Williams v. Smith, 192 Ala. 428, 68 So. 323
(1915).
100 Williams v. Smith, 192 Ala. 428, 68 So. 323 (x915).
'
0 1State ex rel. Burnett v. School District of City of Jefferson, 335 Mo. 803, 74 S.A.2d 30 (1934);
Young v. Trustees of Fountain Inn Graded School, 64 S.C. 131, 41 S.E. 824 (19o).
.02 People v. Moore, 240 Il 408, 88 N.E. 979 (1909).
"0' Chambers v. Everett, 191 Iowa 49, x8i N.W. 867 (192Z).
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ence between the cost of a child's education and what it received from the local
district plus what it got in equalization funds from the state, a Missouri court ruled
against the district. It held that the district could not make such a tuition charge for
a non-resident pupil, but, on the other hand, that it need not accept the pupil. 04
VI
It is a general principle, agreed to by most courts, that schools are maintained
only-or at least primarily-for pupils resident of the district in which the school
is located'0 5 and that pupils residing in the district must be admitted free of tui-
tion.' The rule is different, of course, with respect to non-resident pupils. The
distinction between resident and non-resident pupils is often not dear, and courts
are frequently asked to rule on the right of a district to charge a particular pupil
or pupils tuition. Most of such cases grow out of situations involving one of the
following guestions: (I) the question of the place of residence of the parents, (2)
the question of the right of a child who resides apart from his parents to attend
school in the district in which he resides, and (3) the question of the right of a child
who resides in an orphans' home or other charitable institution to attend school in
the district in which the institution is located.
In general, the courts hold that the residence, for school purposes, of an un-
married child of school age is that of the parents or guardian and cannot be changed
by the minor except under unusual circumstances 17 The real difficulty frequently
arises in determining what constitutes "residence" as used in statutes. In a very few
cases, courts have held that "residence" and "domicile" are synonymous terms. Gen-
erally, however, they take a more liberal view of the matter and hold that residence
for school purposes does not mean "legal domicile in the technical and narrow sense
of residence of a person for purpose of taxation or suffrage."' 8
In certain cases where a family's residence is in a different school district than its
domicile, the question of where the children may attend school free of tuition be-
comes exceedingly important. In some places, particularly at an earlier date, ap-
parently it was not unusual for parents with children of school age to maintain a
more or less temporary residence, apart from their domicile, in order that their chil-
dren might take advantage of better educational opportunities. Where such is the
case, courts are generally agreed that if the parents merely rent a room for the chil-
dren or arrange for them to board in a school district, and if they return to the home
1o State ex rel. Burnett v. School District of City of Jefferson 335 Mo. 803, 74 S.W.ad 30 (1934).
100 See pp. 24-25, supra.
100 See pp. 36-38, supra.
107Smith v. Binford, 44 Idaho 244, 256 Pac. 366 (1927); Board of Education v. McCaskill, 212 Ill.
App. 138 (rg18); People v. Board of Education of School District No. 36, Edwards County, 2o6 Ill.
App. 381 (1917); State ex rel. Flaughter v. Rogers, 226 Ind. 32, 77 N.E.2d 594 (948); Wheeler T.
Burrow, i8 Ind. 14 (1862); Salem Independent School District v. Kiel, 2o6 Iowa 967, 221 N.W. 579
(1928); Sulzen v. School District No. 36 of City of Lecompton, 144 Kan. 648, 62 P.2d 88o (937);
Crain v. Walker, 222 Ky. 828, 2 S.W.2d 654 (1928); School District of Barnard v. Matherly, 90 Mo.
App. 403 (i9ox); Anderson v. Breitbarth, 62 N.D. 709, 245 N.W. 483 (1933).
""Turner v. City Board of Education of City of Mayfield, 313 Ky. 383, 386, 231 S.W.2d 27, 29
(1950).
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of the parents over the week-ends, they do not have a residence in the district within
the meaning of the law.'?9 Where, however, the residence of the entire family is
changed, but the domicile remains in the original district where the father continues
to spend most of his time, the situation is somewhat different. Nevertheless, some
courts have held the children not entitled to attend the schools of the "new" district
tuition-free, as they remain, in reality, residents of the district in which they have
their domicile. In other words, they have held "domicile" and "residence" synony-
mous. They have based their ruling on the fact that domicile and intention are de-
terminative of the fact. In short, they have held that where a new residence is
maintained for the sole purpose of attending school, children are not entitled to free
tuition."' 0 Where, however, the entire family removes to a "new" district for pur-
poses other than that of enrolling the children in the schools of that district, courts
have held differently, even though the domicile remained unchanged. Thus, where
a family moved in order to make it more convenient for the father to follow his
occupation or conduct his business, even though he intended to return at some
future time, courts have approved the attendance of the children in the schools
of the new district, tuition-free.1 One of the most interesting cases of this type
comes from Nebraska. Here, the statute provided that a child should attend the
schools of the district in which the parents "live." When a newly elected Governor
and State Superintendent of Public Instruction took office and moved, temporarily,
to Lincoln, they attempted to enter their children in the public schools, but admission
was denied. In a mandamus action to compel the board to admit them, the court
ruled in favor of the Governor and Superintendent, although it recognized that
they were but temporary residents of Lincoln and retained their legal residences
elsewhere." 2
What has been said, of course, applies to the unemancipated minor. If the parent
emancipates the minor, then, of course, the residence of the minor, regardless of the
purpose for which he maintains it, becomes his residence for school purposes. In
Wisconsin a i6-year old boy was desirous of obtaining a high school education, but
his father was unable to give him the financial assistance necessary. He agreed to
emancipate the boy and.permit him to earn his own livelihood and be his own
master. The boy then went to Richland Center, with the purpose of making that
his home, earning his own living, and going to high school. He had no intention
of returning to his father's home. When the question of the district's authority to
charge him tuition was raised, it was held that he was not required to pay, because
a'Inhabitants of Haverhill v. Gale, 103 Mass. 104 (1869); State ex rel. School District No. i,
Niobara County v. School District No. 12, Niobara County, 45 Wyo. 365, 18 P.2d 1o1o (1933).
10 Sulzen v. School District No. 36 of City of Lecompton, 144 Kan. 648, 62 P.2d 88o (937); State
v. School District of City of Superior, 55 Neb. 317, 75 N.W. 855 (x898); Board of Education of Union
Free School District No. 2, Town of Trenton v. Crill, 149 App. Div. 407, 134 N.Y. Supp. 311 (4 th Dcp't
1912).
... School District No. x Fractional of Mancelona Township v. School District No. x of Custer
Township, 236 Mich. 677, 211 N.W. 6o (1927); Northern v. McCaw, 189 Mo. App. 362, 175 S.W. 317
(i915); State v. Selleck, 76 Neb. 747, 107 N.W. 1022 (19o6).
... State v. Selleck, 76 Neb. 747, 107 N.W. io22 (i9o6).
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he was a resident of the district. He lived in the district and he lived by toil which
came first in his life. School came second.113
While it is a general rule that children can attend school, free, in the district in
which they live, the question has been raised as to the proper district which one
might attend when the house in which he lives is located on the boundary line be-
tween two districts. In Kentucky, where this question faced the court, it held that
under such circumstances the child properly resided in the district in which the
major part of the house was located 1
In those cases where a pupil lives or resides apart from his parents, a somewhat
different question is involved. Here, the question is whether the residence of the
child, for school purposes, is in the district of the family's domicile or in the district
where the child is actually residing. In a few cases it has been held that the child's
residence is the domicile of the parents or guardian regardless of his reason for
living apart from them. 15
While, as has been said, some courts have held that a child's residence is that
of the parents, and that the child cannot obtain another, the best rule, it would
appear, and the one most commonly followed by the courts, is that if a child is living
apart from his parents or guardian, he may attend school, free, in the district in which
he actually makes his home, providing he is living in the district for some purpose
other than merely that of taking advantage of its educational opportunities 1 8 Need-
less to say, the application of this rule could make for some injustice in the case of
particular school districts. This appeared to be the main contention in a case that
arose in Maine. Here, a boy, who was a ward of the state, was committed, by court
proceedings, to the custody of the state board of children's guardians. The board
placed the boy in the home of a Mrs. Whalen of Yarmouth-a town in which his
parents had no legal residence. Because Mrs. Whalen was not his guardian, the
question arose as to whether the boy had the right to attend the public schools free
" Kidd v. Joint School District No. 2, City of Richland Center and Town of Richland, x94 Wis.
253, 216 N.W. 499 (x928).
",Turner v. City Board of Education of City of Mayfield, 313 Ky. 383, 231 S.W.2d 27 (1950).
"'Wheeler v. Burrow, 18 Ind. 14 (z862); Board of Education of City of Winchester v. Foster, i16
Ky. 484, 76 S.W. 354 (903); Binde v. Klinge, 30 Mo. App. 285 (1888); Mansfield Township Board
of Education v. State Board of Education, ioi N.J.L. 474, 129 Ad. 765 (1925).
" Cline v. Knight, iii Colo. 8, 137 P.2d 68o (943); Fangman v. Moyers, go Colo. 3o8, 8 P.2d
762 (1932); Yale v. West Middle School District, 59 Conn. 489, 22 Ad. 295 (189o); Board of Educa-
tion v. Lease, 64 Ill. App. 6o (x895); Dean v. Board of Education of School District No. 89, 386 IlL.
156, 53 N.E.2d 875 (1944); People v. Board of Education of School District No. 36, Edwards
County, 2o6 Ill. App. 381 (ig97); Mt. Hope School District v. Hendrickson, 197 Iowa 191, 197 N.W.
47 (1924); Board of Trustees of Stanford Graded Common School District v. Powell, 145 Ky. 93, 140
S.W. 67 (igsi); Shaw v. Small, 124 Me. 36, 125 At. 496 (1924); State ex rel. Halbert v. Clymer, 164
Mo. App. 671, 147 S.W. 1119 (1912); McNish v. State ex rel. Dimick, 74 Neb. 26z, 104 N.W. 186
(1905); Martins v. School District No. 30 of Cuming County, zoi Neb. 258, 162 N.W. 631 (1917);
Mizner v. School District No. ii of Sherman County, 2 Neb. (Unof.) 238, 96 N.W. 128 (0goi),
afl'd, 2 Neb. (Unof.) 242, 96 N.W. ioo6 (1903); People cx rel. Brooklyn Children's Aid Society v.
Hendrickson, 125 App. Div. 256, xo9 N.Y. Supp. 403 (2d Dep't x9o8), afl'd, 196 N.Y. 551, 9o N.E.
1163 (19o9); Anderson v. Breitbarth, 62 N.D. 709, 245 N.W. 483 (933); Board of Education of City
of El Reno v. Hobbs, 8 Okla. 293, 56 Pac. 1052 (1899); Confluence Borough School District v. Ursina
Borough School District, 88 Pa. Super. 299 (1926); State v. Thayer, 74 Wis. 48, 41 N.W. 1014 (1889).
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of tuition. The court, in holding that he did, ruled that the "statutes relating to
public schools should receive a liberal construction in aid of their dominant purpose
which is universal elementary education.""'  To the contention that the placing of
some 23 wards of the state in the town of Yarmouth, by the state board of children's
guardians, constituted a burden upon the town, the court pointed out that there was
merit to this contention, but that only the legislature and not the courts could grant
the necessary relief.
In a Pennsylvania case, however, a court ruled differently." Here, in the
case of a child who had been committed, as a result of court proceedings, to the
care of another, it held that the child had no right to attend school free of tuition in
the district in which the person to whom he was committed lived. The court
reasoned that, in this type of case, an involuntary relationship existed between the
child and guardian, as far as the child was concerned. It also characterized this as
a business relationship assumed by the guardian for the purpose of making a living.
As a result, it reasoned that such homes, to which children were committed, were
only temporary places for the detention of the children. Consequently, it ruled that
the presence in the district of a dependent and incorrigible child did not constitute
a residence.
It must not be forgotten, however, that courts are generally agreed that children
residing apart from their parents for the sole, or primary, purpose of attending school
in the district to which they have moved are not entitled to free tuition." 0
A still different situation prevails in the case of a child who resides in an orphans'
home or some other type of charitable institution. Then the question of the right
of the child to attend school in the district in which the home or institution is located
comes to the forefront. In most of such cases the courts have held that the child
has this right, providing he is under the control of the home's authorities and is
residing in the home for purposes other than that of attending school.120  In one
of the earliest cases of this type, in which a New Hampshire court ruled that chil-
dren dwelling in a poorhouse were entitled to attend schools in the district in which
117 Shaw v. Small, 124 Me. 36, 40, 125 Ad. 496, 498 (1924).
... Black v. Graham, 238 Pa. 381, 86 Ad. 266 (913).
11 People v. Board of Education, 26 I1. App. 476 (1888); Wheeler v. Burrow, 18 Ind. x4 (1862);
Mt. Hope School District v. Hendrickson, 197 Iowa 191, 197 NAV. 47 (1924); School District No. I
v. Brogdon, 23 N.H. (3 Fost.) 507 (r85i); Mansfield Township Board of Education v. State Board of
Education, ioi N.J.L.47 4 , 129 At. 765 (1925); Horowitz v. Board of Education of City of Yonkers,
217 App. Div. 233, 2x6 N.Y. Supp. 646 (2d Dep't 1926); State v. Board of Education of City of Eau
Claire, 96 Wis. 95, 7i N.W. 123 (1897).
.. Ashley v. Board of Education, 275 I1. 274, 114 N.E. 20 (1916); Logsdon v. Jones, 311 111. 425,
143 N.E. 56 (1924); Salem Independent School District v. Kiel, 2o6 Iowa 967, 221 N.W. 519 (1928);
School Township 76 of Muscatine County v. Nicholson, 227 Iowa 290, 288 N.W. 123 (939); Mariadahl
Children's Home v. Bellegarde School District No. 23, 163 Kan. 49, 18o P.2d 612 (1947); Crain v.
Walker, 222 Ky. 828, 2 S.W.2d 654 (1928); Jefferson County Board of Education v. Goheen, 3o6 Ky.
439, 207 S.W.2d 567 (1947); State ex rel. Board of Christian Service of Lutheran Minnesota Conference
v. School Board of Consolidated School District No. 3, 206 Minn. 63, 287 N.W. 625 (1939); School
District No. 2 v. Pollard, 55 N.H. 503 (1875); State ex rel. Johnson v. Cotton, 67 S.D. 63, 289 N.W.
71 (1939); Grande Lodge I.O.O.F., of West Virginia v. Board of Education of Independent School Dis-
trict of Elkins, 9o W. Va. 8, 11o S.E. 440 (1922).
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the poorhouse was located, the language of the court is especially interesting. It
said:121
.. . charity will continue to dispense not bread alone, but, without distinction of
person, the blessings of moral culture and the means of mental illumination, even as God
pours his sunbeams alike upon the just and unjust.
In spite of this general rule, the decisions of some courts have been to the con-
trary.122 The exceptions to the general rule are, on the whole, more apparent than
real. For example, two of the Ohio cases appear to have been decided in terms of
a statute that made the school district in which a child had formerly resided liable
for his tuition when he became an inmate of a home of the sort involved there.
21
Also, one of the Pennsylvania cases involved an interpretation of two statutes. 24
One provided that the residence of a child who has no parents or guardian shall be
considered to be in the district in which the person who sustains a parental relation-
ship toward the child resides. Another provided that a board of school directors of
a district in which an orphans' home was located could permit children who were
inmates of the home, but who were not residents, to attend school with or without
the payment of tuition. It also provided that if tuition was charged it was to be
paid for by the district from which the child had come.
Again, in one Pennsylvania and in one Michigan case, at least one decisive factor
influencing the court's opinion was the fact that the charitable institution or home
was created in part for the purpose of educating the children admitted 25 It should
also be pointed out that the Vermont case has a slightly different angle than most
of the other cases.' 2' Here, the court held that where a town supported its pauper
children in a poorhouse operated jointly with other towns, the education of the
child remained the responsibility of the town from which the child came and did not
shift to the town in which the poorhouse was located.
If these cases, just commented upon, are ignored, it is apparent that the exceptions
to the general rule-minor inmates of charitable institutions are entitled to attend
schools tuition-free in the districts in which the institutions are located-are compara-
tively few in number.
... School District No. 2 v. Pollard, 55 N.H. 503, 507 (1875).
""Child Welfare Society of Flint v. Kennedy School District, 22o Mich. 2go, 18g N.W. oo2 (1922);
Lake Farm v. District Board of School District No. 2, Kalamazoo Township, 179 Mich. 17l, 146 N.W.
' 5 (1914); State ex rel. Methodist Children's Home Association of Worthington v. Board of Education of
Worthington Village School District of Franklin County, mo5 Ohio St. 438, 138 N.E. 865 (1922); State v.
Directors of School District No. X4, so Ohio St. 448 (1859); State v. Sherman, 104 Ohio St. 317, 135 N.E.
625 (1922); Commonwealth v. Directors of Upper Swatara School District, 164 Pa. 603, 30 Atl. 507
(1894); School District of Borough of Ben Avon v. School District of Pittsburgh, 77 Pa. Super. 75 (1921);
Sheldon Poor-House Asssociation v. Town of Sheldon, 72 Vt. 126, 47 Adt. 542 (1900).
'a State ex rel. Methodist Children's Home Association of Worthington v. Board of Education of
Worthington Village School District of Franklin County, 105 Ohio St. 438, 138 N.E. 865 (1922); State
v. Sherman, 104 Ohio St. 317, 135 N.E. 625 (922).
... School District of Borough of Ben Avon v. School District of Pittsburgh, 77 Pa. Super. 75 (92).
... Lake Farm v. District Board of School District No. 2, Kalamazoo Township, 179 Mich. 171, 146
N.W. 115 (914); Commonwealth v. Directors of Upper Swatara School District, 164 Pa. 603, 30 Ad.
507 (1894).
" Sheldon Poor-House Association v. Town of Sheldon, 72 Vt. 126, 47 At. 542 (1900).
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One other aspect of the problem of school attendance concerns the right of chil-
dren to elect to attend school tuition-free, in the district in which the parents own
property and pay taxes, rather than in the district of residence. In the absence of a
statute to the contrary, a child cannot attend school tuition-free, in a district in which
the parent pays taxes, unless it is the district in which he resides.'m Where there is
a statute concerning this matter, it is, of course, decisive. In South Carolina the
statute provided that a parent could elect to send his children to a district adjoining
the one in which he resided if he owned property and paid taxes there. In a recent
case the court held this law was not unconstitutional and did not unlawfully dis-
criminate against persons not holding property in adjoining districts. Furthermore,
it held that the fact that a parent acquired property in an adjoining district for the
sole purpose of enabling him to send his children to school in that district was im-
material. Also, it held of no consequence the facts that the property was of little
value and that the taxes amounted to but three or four dollars per year. 28 In
Kansas the legislature had passed a similar statute. Later, it passed another statute
that gave rural high school boards the authority to collect tuition from non-resident
pupils. In an action involving the right of a parent to elect to send his children to
school, tuition-free, to a district in which he was a property owner, but not a res-
ident, it was held that he could not on the ground that the latter statute controlled
and so acted to repeal the former one.' 29
12'Reed v. Mason County Board of Education, 22o Ky. 489, 295 S.W. 436 (1927); Cape Girardeau
School District No. 63 of Cape Girardeau County v. Frye, 225 S.W.2d 484 (Mo. 1949); Logan City
School District v. Kowallis, 94 Utah 342, 77 P.2d 348 (1938).
... Moseley v. Welch, 218 S.C. 242, 62 S.E.2d 313 (1950).
... Burling v. Trembley, X13 Kan. 746, 216 PaC. 285 (1923).
